Mumbai: Double Cover IV – RTT
Despite the apparent confusion and the obvious media spin, the picture that emerged from the early reporting of the Mumbai attacks was a fairly comprehensible one: a picture of a false flag commando raid.
It was a commando raid, as opposed to a suicide bombing or other forms of terrorist attack; surely that much was clear to everybody. There were multiple commandos and multiple targets, and it was obvious that a great deal of knowledge and skill must have gone into the planning.
But it was also clearly a false flag attack, as the multiple simultaneous attempts to pin the blame (or take the responsibility) made no sense, singly or in combination. Even as the shooting was going on, the Indian government was saying the attackers (whoever they were) had come from outside the country. A “terrorist group” calling itself the “Deccan Mujahideen” had claimed responsibility, but no terror expert had ever heard of such a group.
In reality-based situations (of which this is not one!), the analysis of such a horrible crime would begin with the known facts, and it would proceed in a systematic fashion, from the knowns to the unknowns.
For instance, one might start with the observation that the Mumbai assault was a highly-coordinated commando raid, and then raise the questions: “Who does this sort of thing?” and “Among those who do this sort of thing, who had something to gain by doing this?”
These are questions we never saw asked, let alone answered, in the mainstream media. It seems quite clear to me, and one of the reasons for the title of this series, that they don’t ask these questions because they’re afraid of the answers. So instead of intelligent, penetrating, appropriate analysis, we got nonsense.
To begin with the official account, let’s just say the official account of the attacks makes very little sense. Supposedly there were only ten attackers, and supposedly they attacked in 13 locations more or less simultaneously. Nobody in the mainstream seems prepared to ask how something like this could have happened without inside help. Some analysts pointed out that a high degree of local knowledge must have been required for such an attack, but they went on to conclude that therefore the attackers must have been foreigners. It was difficult to imagine a more counter-intuitive conclusion; but not for long.
Nobody asked: “Who could do this?” or “Who would do this?” Instead they asked: “How did al Qaeda do this?” and “Why did al Qaeda do this?” After a while it became more or less obvious that the Mumbai attacks didn’t involve hijacked airplanes crashing into buildings (like al Qaeda in North America) or suicide bombers and car bombs (like al Qaeda in the Middle East). And connecting al Qaeda to these attacks directly became a bit of a problem. So then instead of asking “Who else could have done this?”, they began to ask: “How are the perpetrators of this attack connected to al Qaeda?”